For many years now, the EU’s diplomatic strategy for dealing with the Russian Federation has been muted by the overwhelming pressure of Germany. The Central European country has for many years been an obstacle in the way of a much stricter foreign policy from Brussels – much to the dismay of countries on the Eastern flank of the Union.
Whilst Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are readily aware of the threat posed by the EU’s largest eastern neighbour – Western allies have often turned a blind eye to the reality of the risk posed by the superpower. In particular Germany, which has for the last fifteen years been headed by Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, has taken a more passive approach and for the most part influenced European foreign policy on the same lines.
The reason why Germany has been so slow to wake up to the threat from Russia is threefold. Firstly, it is a matter of geography – for Germany Russia is half a continent away and not such an immediate threat. Secondly, Germany is heavily dependent on Russian gas, brought in by pipelines across Eastern Europe. Thirdly, German political parties have long been subject to Russian manipulation, ensuring that there is always a defensive voice within the Bundestag.
The second and third points are however perhaps the most important when understanding why, up until now, Germany has been so slow to act on aggression from the East. In particular – German dependence on Russian gas has been the cause of much contention. Germany imports over 60 per cent of its energy – with the largest fulfilment of that demand coming from Russia. Since shutting down their nuclear energy capabilities – Germany has turned more and more to gas, importing 94 per cent of the natural gas that it needs to keep the lights on. Thus, Germany is so keen on the swift construction of the Nord Stream II gas line, which would double the total cubic metres imported.
This overreliance on Russian imports has led Germany to fear that taking too tough a stance against Russia would lead to the pipelines being shut off – as happened in 2009 during the dispute with Ukraine. While alternatives exist to coal and gas – Germanys political parties are unwilling to switch the nuclear power plants back on or consider importing LNG from the United States.
Which is in part because of the other key point – that the German political system has an inherent problem with influence from Russia. In recent years, the influence of Russia has been exposed in both the far-right Alternative für Deutschland and the far-left Die Linke. Both political parties have sizable representation in both the Bundestag and European Parliament – with the AfD taking the position of Official Opposition in the former.
Russian propaganda outlets such as RT Germany and Sputnik have been known to spread fake news stories to stir political tensions inside Germany. On a small scale, they run stories claiming that face masks are a violation of civil liberties or that the coronavirus does not exist. On a larger scale, they stoke up racial tension within the country and offer heavy criticism of the government for its approach to the migrant crisis. In many ways these propaganda outlets play on the disillusionment of those on the fringes of politics by offering them what they want to hear and driving a wedge between them and the mainstream media. In much of what is written – they take an anti-American and anti-transatlantic approach.
In January 2016, a Russian-German girl named Lisa claimed to have been raped by a group of immigrants in Berlin. This story came out just a few weeks after the New Year’s Eve scandal in Köln. Her story immediately went viral and sparked anti-migrant protests by Russians living in Germany and by many Germans as well. German police stated in a press release that Lisa’s story was false. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov however proclaimed that German authorities had concealed the actual events and failed to protect “our Lisa”, which played into the narrative of the far-right. The case cemented the bond between the Russian state and the far-right.
Just as equally Die Linke have bought into Russian narratives – with a delegation of their MPs visiting the two breakaway Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine in 2015. Die Linke were also among the first western political parties to claim that the Crimean Peninsula was a part of Russia rather than Ukraine. Die Linke have also long opposed the introduction of sanctions against Russia over the same issue.
But it is not just the extremes of politics that have taken a less than critical approach to Russia. The race to succeed Angela Merkel as leader of the Christian Democrats has put focus on front runner Armin Laschet – who has for the most part adopted a soft stance on Russia. He, like many others in Germany, is keen to maintain good relations with Russia and so holds back from criticising the government of Vladimir Putin. His likely election as leader of the CDU, and as Chancellor of Germany, could see German foreign policy towards Russia soften more.
Of course, Germany is now starting to wake up to the threat, slowly. The recent events surrounding Russian Opposition leader Alexei Navalny – who was treated in Germany for Novichok poisoning – have finally shone a light on the extent of Russian malpractice. Earlier in the year, in June, the German parliament was subject to an attack by Russian hackers. This ultimately led to a call for new sanctions – yet the tone remained soft.
It is obvious that until Germany adopts a stronger tone on the issue, the EU will continue to be neutered when it comes to standing up against Russia. And as a result, countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and the Baltics will continue to have to live in fear in the shadow of a hostile power.